#390 We Don't Want The Smoking Gun To Be A Mushroom Cloud: Intelligence On Iraq's WMD (2004) By R. Huisken
 
Working Paper No. 390
 
In the second half of 2002, when the US intelligence community was tasked to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD capacities, the administration had been already been saying for over six months that Iraq under Saddam posed an intolerable risk that the US was determined to address. In other words, intelligence was catching up with policy. Moreover, the administration’s determination to proceed in the face of widespread opposition meant that the stakes in terms of US credibility and prestige were seen in Washington as having become dauntingly large. In the event, the intelligence community slid over the fact that it had too few ‘dots’ to make confident judgments on WMD in Iraq
 
Soft Cover
76 pages
In Good Condition